ANTNUMIAL LAW IN NEW JERSEY
Andrew j.Kyreakakis*
INTRODUCTION

There are few areas of our law which are so emotionally
charged and expose attorneys to such ominous risks as antenuptial
agreements. The stakes are inordinately high, and one misstep can
spell disaster for both client and attorney.
Because this area of law is intricate, the standards for formulating an antenuptial agreement that will withstand legal attack are
not immutable. To the contrary, antenuptials have a chameleon
quality as the standards for upholding them vary, depending on a
multiplicity of factors. The relevant issues include the date the
agreement was executed, the level of disclosure of the parties' assets, the nature of the legal representation, if any, the knowledge
and the sophistication of the parties, and whether the agreement
addresses divorce, death, or both. We shall embark on our journey
into the realm of New Jersey antenuptial law by exploring the different categories of agreements and the critical elements that will
ensure their validity.
I.

OVERVIEW

On November 3, 1988, the NewJersey Legislature enacted the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 1 (Uniform Act or Act), which
attempted to provide uniform principles governing antenuptial
agreements executed in New Jersey. The Act was expressly made
prospective as it was made effective to antenuptial agreements "executed on and after its effective date."2
The interpretation and validity of antenuptial agreements executed before enactment of the Uniform Act turned on whether the
agreement related to a divorce or a probate setting. Antenuptial
agreements which came into effect at death were governed by another statute,3 which is part of NewJersey's Uniform Probate Code.
Antenuptial agreements resulting in divorce were governed by New
* Mr. Kyreakakis is a partner with Ambrosio, Kyreakakis & DiLorenzo, which successfully defended the antenuptial agreement in Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis, 260 N.J.

Super. 50, 615 A.2d 266 (App. Div. 1992).
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2-31 to -41 (West Supp. 1992).
2 Id. § 37:2-41.
3 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-10 (West 1983).
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Jersey case law, and in particular by the chancery division's seminal
holding in Marschall v. Marschall,4 and its progeny.
This pre-Uniform Act case law continues to maintain its relevance because many, and probably most, of the existing antenuptial agreements in New Jersey were executed before enactment of
the Uniform Act. The Uniform Act has also adopted many of the
tenets in the prior antenuptial law, and this body of law has been
integrated into the Uniform Act.
This Article will provide a comprehensive review and analysis
of New Jersey antenuptial law. It will explore New Jersey antenuptial law in the context of both divorce and death for the periods
before and after the enactment of the Uniform Act.
II.

WHEN AN ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT

Is

(AND

Is

NOT)

NECESSARY

In order to resolve this seemingly simple (but in reality inordinately complex) issue, one must first focus on fundamentals.
Divorce

A.

The starting point in the divorce context is the NewJersey statute governing equitable distribution.5 This statute exempts from
such distribution all property owned by either spouse before marriage. In the phraseology of the statute, equitable distribution applies only to the parties' "real and personal" property which was
"legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during
the marriage."6
An antenuptial agreement therefore is not needed to secure
property that was obtained before the marriage. Moreover, assets
"for which the original property may be exchanged or into which
it, or the proceeds of its sale, may be traceable shall similarly be
considered the separate property of the particular spouse."7
This having been said, there are many reasons which militate
in favor of preparing an antenuptial agreement where one or both
spouses wish to maintain sole ownership of certain assets. As a
practical matter, after marriage many assets become intermingled.
Further, it is often cumbersome, if not impossible, to trace proceeds back to premarital property. Even where such tracing could
be achieved, certain monies earned, and certain asset appreciation
4
5
6
7

195 N.J. Super. 16, 477 A.2d 833 (Ch. Div. 1984).

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.34-23 (West 1987).
Id.
Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974).
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which occurs during marriage, are subject to equitable distribution. The rules as to what assets are distributable upon divorce
have become intricate, with courts groping to answer this issue by
drawing distinctions between the nature of the property acquired,
when it was acquired, and in whose name. These distinctions often
become blurred and strained. For example, property acquired
before the marriage can be deemed "passive" in nature and thus
excluded from equitable distribution, or "active" and thus subject
to distribution where the non-owner spouse contributed to the
property's appreciation.8
In light of all this ambiguity, an antenuptial agreement is
mandatory where substantial assets are involved and/or the parties
desire to maintain separate ownership for themselves and in some
instances ultimately for children of prior marriages. The need for
a prenuptial agreement is heightened by the principle that the burden for the exclusion of an asset from equitable distribution "will
rest upon the spouse who asserts it."9
B. Death
A properly drafted antenuptial agreement will also secure
property in the event of death. Without an antenuptial agreement,
a surviving spouse is statutorily guaranteed an elective share in the
deceased spouse's property. And unlike the safeguards provided
by the equitable distribution law, the decedent's premarital (as well
as the postmarital) property is subject to the elective share.
The elective share essentially entitles the surviving spouse to a
one-third share of the decedent's assets.10 The estate is "augmented" by adding to the basic estate certain other assets, primarily consisting of various transfers made by the decedent.11 The
estate that is subject to the one-third elective share is also augmented by all gifts given to the surviving spouse by the decedent at
any time before his/her death.1" The estate is further augmented
by life insurance proceeds and retirement and pension plans received by the survivor after the decedent's death."3 Again, the sur8 See, e.g., Scavone v. Scavone, 230 N.J. Super. 482, 553 A.2d 885 (Ch. Div. 1988)
(providing a multifaceted analysis of property acquisition and when it is subject to
equitable distribution).
9 Landwehr v. Landwehr, 111 N.J. 491, 504, 545 A.2d 738, 744 (1988) (quoting
Painter, 65 N.J. at 214, 320 A.2d at 493).
10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-1 (West 1983).
11 Id. § 3B:8-3.
12 Id. § 3B:8-6.
13 Id. § 3B:8-7
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viving spouse receives a one-third elective share in these assets as
well.
In some instances, the statutory scheme gives the surviving
spouse "double" benefits. For example, where the surviving spouse
invokes the elective share and is the named beneficiary in the deceased spouse's life insurance policy, then the survivor receives all
the insurance proceeds and one-third of these proceeds again from
the augmented estate. This result, however, is rectified somewhat
by another provision in the statute which provides that the surviving spouse's elective share shall be satisfied by the value of property
owned by the surviving spouse at the time of death. 4 It is irrelevant when or from whom this property was derived. For example,
it could have been acquired before or after the marriage, from the
spouse's own efforts, or inherited or received from the deceased.
An elective share is also satisfied by property "succeeded to by the
surviving spouse as a result of decedent's death," which would include property in joint names and presumably insurance
proceeds.15

An antenuptial agreement is thus critical in certain circumstances to avoid calamitous results in the event of death. By way of
illustration, the decedent may have had children from a prior marriage with whom he/she had established joint businesses or assets
perhaps even before the decedent met the second spouse. Without an antenuptial agreement, the surviving spouse can lay claim to
his/her elective share in these businesses and assets to the horror
of the decedent's children and their own respective families. Indeed, the elective share statute specifically provides that the other
beneficiaries of the decedent must each contribute and "make up"
the elective share of the surviving spouse.' 6 They must either give
up part of the property transferred to them or pay the value of the
elective share in the property to the surviving spouse.
III.

ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND

DIVORCE BEFORE

ENACTMENT OF THE UNIFORM

THE

ACT

As improbable as it seems in an era when divorce is so rife, as

late as 1970 antenuptial agreements contemplating divorce were
considered to be void as against public policy. While that view is
14 Id. § 3B:8-18; Matter of Estate of Holling, 263 NJ. Super 146, 149-50 (App. Div.

1993).
15 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-18(a) (West 1983).

16 Id. § 3B:8-19.
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now considered to be antediluvian, it was not until 1984 that this
traditional view was renounced in New Jersey.
The decision disavowing the traditional view was enunciated in
the hallmark case of Marschall v. Marschall 7 decided by Judge
Lesemann in the chancery division. MarschaUremains the pivotal
judicial pronouncement in this area of New Jersey law.
The Marschall court established for New Jersey a legal tenet
which has been the sine qua non for the validity of an antenuptial
agreement in a divorce context-the rule of full disclosure. The
"full disclosure" concept has been carried on, with certain exceptions, by the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.1 8 The parameters of this rule can be gleaned from a review of the facts in the
Marschalldecision.
The court summarized the assets owned by the plaintiff and
her husband before the marriage. The plaintiffs assets consisted
of the proceeds of the sale of her home (approximately $200,000),
annual interest and dividend interest of $20,000, and $200 per
month in social security payments. The husband's net worth was
$5 million and his annual income was $250,000.
The antenuptial agreement provided that in the event of divorce, the wife would receive $100,000 "in full satisfaction of all
claims" against her husband. 9 The agreement failed to include
any description of the parties' respective assets. Plaintiff claimed in
the litigation that she was without the "remotest idea" and did not
have an "inkling" of her betrothed's vast wealth and that he was
"'very cleverly duping [her]' into an unfair agreement."2 0
The parties had signed the antenuptial agreement six weeks
before their marriage. Plaintiff had been represented by independent counsel who had apparently participated in the negotiations on her behalf.
The husband contended that plaintiffs independent representation validated the agreement. The court disagreed and cogently expressed the rationale for the full disclosure rule:
Thus, the claim by defendant here that plaintiff was represented
by independent counsel is not enough. Such representation
might support an argument that plaintiff knew the meaning of
the agreement she was signing. Indeed, the agreement is rela17 195 N.J. Super. 16, 477 A.2d 833 (Ch. Div. 1984).
18

For a discussion of the Uniform Act, see infra notes 103-129 and accompanying

text.
19 Marschal, 195 N.J. Super. at 21, 477 A.2d at 835.
20

Id. at 22, 477 A.2d at 836.
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tively simple and there would seem no basis for a claim to the
contrary. Awareness of the meaning of the words in the agreement, however, does not demonstrate that plaintiff knew she
was marrying a man with assets of at least $5,000,000 and an
annual income in excess of $250,000. It does not demonstrate
that with such information she nevertheless expressed herself as
willing to accept a total of $100,000 and (as defendant contends) no alimony of any kind if the marriage did not succeed.
It is altogether possible that plaintiff might have rejected the
proposed agreement if full disclosure had indicated to her that
the proposal was blatantly unfair. It is even possible that full
disclosure might have suggested such a lack of generosity on the
part of her intended husband as to call into question her basic
decision to marry.2 1
Judge Lesemann analogized antenuptial agreements to property
settlement agreements which are executed as part of a divorce settlement and are premised on full disclosure and full awareness of the
other party's financial status. Indeed, the court concluded that the
need for full disclosure is even more compelling in the context of
antenuptial agreements. A property settlement agreement has certain
inherent safeguards lacking in an antenuptial agreement, and is executed at a time when relations have deteriorated. Discovery is available, the parties usually negotiate at arms length, and "the
proceeding-almost by definition-is adversarial." 22 By comparison,
an antenuptial agreement is usually entered into when the parties
have forged a close bond, and mutual trust and confidence prevail.
The court adopted a "full disclosure" standard for antenuptial agreements contemplating divorce, requiring disclosure of assets and their
value. The burden of proving such full financial disclosure was im23
posed on the party seeking to enforce the agreement.
The Marschallcourt also assisted practitioners by outlining a procedure for them to follow in crafting antenuptial agreements that
would withstand attack in the future. The following procedure was
posited:
As a practical matter, and looking to the future use of antenup21
22
23

Id. at 30, 477 A.2d at 840.
Id. at 29, 477 A.2d at 840.
Id. at 33, 477 A.2d at 842. The court reasoned:
Thus, in this case, it is the defendant who knows what his income and
assets were and are. It will be much easier for him to demonstrate what
he told his wife and what the facts were, than it would be for her to
establish the negative of that proposition: that her husband did have
certain assets or income and failed to tell her about them.
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tial agreements, disclosure and proof thereof should be relatively simple. The easiest device would probably be a schedule
annexed to the agreement setting out, at least in general terms
and with approximate values, the assets of the parties as well as
their income over the past few years. Normally such disclosure
should be adequate although, of course, there may be cases
where additional information would be required. With such a
procedure, the presentation and attempted enforcement of the
antenuptial agreement at a later date would automatically bring
before the court the statement of disclosure (as part of the
agreement) and the proponent thereof would need only to present evidence that such was indeed
his or her condition at the
24
time the agreement was signed.
The Marschalldecision spawned a famous trilogy of cases on antenuptial divorce agreements. The first of these was the case of
D'Onofrio v. D'Onoftio.25 In the D'Onofrio antenuptial agreement, the
defendant acknowledged that he possessed a "substantial estate" and
the plaintiff was "without a substantial estate of either realty or personalty."26 The plaintiff received $1,000 for her agreement to relinquish
any claims to defendant's property in the event of termination of the
marriage. The parties also recognized in their antenuptial agreement
that the consideration received by plaintiff "may be out of all propor27
tion to that to which as a wife she would be entitled."
In the D'Onofriocase, unlike the Marschallscenario, the prenuptial agreement was prepared solely by the husband's attorney who had
advised the plaintiff to retain independent counsel. The court found
28
that "such representation was waived."
The appellate division first opined its approval of Judge
Lesemann's "comprehensive exposition and analysis" on the enforceability of antenuptial agreements fixing post-divorce rights and obligations as stated in MarschalL' The appeals court further approved
Marschall's reversal of precedent which had granted "only grudging
acceptance" to such contracts and declared that thereafter "courts
should welcome and encourage such agreements. " ' °
The D'Onofrio decision stands for the proposition that there is
more than one way to provide the requisite "full disclosure." The fol24 Id.
25 200 N.J. Super. 361, 491 A.2d
26 Id. at 364, 491 A.2d at 754.
27 Id. at 364-65, 491 A.2d at 754.
28 Id. at 364, 491 A.2d at 753.
29 Id. at 366, 491 A.2d at 754.

752 (App. Div. 1985).

30 Id. at 366, 491 A.2d at 754-55 (citing Marschal4 195 N.J. Super. at 28, 477 A.2d at
839).
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lowing scenario fulfilled this standard even though the agreement was
devoid of an inventory of assets with values: "Plaintiff knew of defendant's assets in detail prior to the marriage, since both prior to and
for her husband, noting
during the marriage she acted as bookkeeper
31
mortgages."
and
rents
of
payment
the
. The following year, the chancery division enunciated its opinion
in DeLorean v. DeLorean.3 2 In this case, the husband presented his intended with an antenuptial agreement only a few hours before the
scheduled marriage ceremony. The agreement provided that any assets acquired by the other before and after the marriage would remain
his/her sole property without any rights vesting in the other. Mr.
DeLorean threatened to cancel the marriage if plaintiff did not sign.
Plaintiff did not have independent counsel of her own choosing.
Before she signed the agreement, however, she privately consulted
with an attorney selected by her husband who advised her not to sign.
She rejected the attorney's advice and executed the agreement.
The husband was twenty-five years older than the plaintiff. His
potential assets were $20 million or greater. The parties were married
for thirteen years and had two children together. Absent the agreement, the wife could have anticipated receiving 50% of the marital
assets at the time of the divorce.
Judge Imbriani examined several factors in determining the validity of the agreement. The Achilles heel of the agreement was, again,
its lack of adequate disclosure. The following disclosure in the parties' agreement did not pass judicial muster: "Husband is the owner
of substantial real and personal property and he has reasonable prospects of earning large sums of monies; these facts have been fully disclosed to Wife.""
The following additional disclosure (which apparently was made
orally) was also not enough to validate the agreement under New
Jersey law: "[H] e had an interest in a farm in California, a large tract
34
of land in Montana, and a share in a major league baseball club."
The particular agreement was upheld only because it recited that
California law would apply and because of other conflict of laws rules
which the court found applicable to this agreement. The DeLorean
court addressed the issue "of how to avoid disputes of this nature in
the future."" Following the Marschall lead, the court provided the
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 367, 491 A.2d at 755.
211 N.J. Super. 432, 511 A.2d 1257 (Ch. Div. 1986).
Id. at 438, 511 A.2d at 1260.
Id. at 440, 511 A.2d at 1261.
Id. at 438, 511 A.2d at 1260.
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following guidance to practitioners:
It is clear that we can ascertain with complete certainty whether
there was a full and complete disclosure only by requiring a written list of assets and income be attached to the antenuptial
agreement. Anything less will encourage a plethora of plenary
hearings which would frequently be complicated by contradictory and
conflicting testimony, often tainted by memory
36
lapses.
A recent and significant judicial pronouncement on the validity
of antenuptial agreements, when divorce ensues, was the 1989 appellate division decision in OrgLer v. Orgler.Y The parties in Orgier began
living together when defendant was separated from his first wife.
Plaintiff suspended her psychiatric residency and moved in with defendant. The latter held partnership interests in several New Jersey
Midas Muffler shops and possessed interests in several other properties. The plaintiff commenced to work three days a week at defendant's office.
The parties entered into an antenuptial agreement and waived
their rights to any of the assets which either of the parties owned at
the time of the marriage. They also waived their right to equitable
distribution and alimony.
Defendant's attorney chose another lawyer to represent plaintiff.
Plaintiff met this attorney for the first time on the date the agreement
was signed and they consulted for less than an hour. The attorney did
not advise her about her legal entitlement to equitable distribution
and alimony. The attorney advised her not to sign the agreement. As
in DeLorean, the plaintiff did not heed her attorney's advice and
signed the agreement. Defendant, who described his wife as "fiercely
independent," claimed that preparation of the prenuptial contract
was plaintiff's idea. 8
The amount of marital assets at issue, as evaluated at the trial, was
over $4 million. On the issue of disclosure, the agreement stated that
each party had complete knowledge of any and all assets owned by the
other party. The parties did not append a list of their assets to the
agreement. Defendant argued that the plaintiff was privy to his business dealings while working at his office.
The appellate division reiterated Marschall's full disclosure rule
Id.
237 N.J. Super. 342, 568 A.2d 67 (App. Div. 1989). The most recent court decision interpreting the validity of antenuptial agreements in a divorce setting isJacobitti
v. Jacobitti, 263 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 1993), which followed the Marschall,
DeLorean-Orgleranalysis. Id. at 612-13.
38 Id. at 347, 568 A.2d at 69.
36

37
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as well as that decision's direction to practitioners that the "easiest
device" to demonstrate such disclosure is by "annexing to the agreement a list of assets with their approximate values."3 9 Orger,however,
went one logical step further by providing that to uphold the validity
of such an antenuptial agreement, two conditions must be fulfilled.
The proponent must demonstrate that the agreement was waived not
only after full disclosure of assets, but also after an explanation of the
nature of the rights being renounced. The court declared that the
"plaintiff did not understand the concepts of equitable distribution
and alimony."' The court surmised that this "misunderstanding" was
in no doubt due to the fact that her counsel met with her for only one
hour on the date the agreement was executed. 41 The appellate division found that the attorney did not advise her of the "intricate factors" involved in equitable distribution or of "her potential
entitlement to rehabilitative or even permanent alimony."42
Org/er poses some worrisome problems for practitioners. To what
degree must an attorney extend herself to comply with the Org/er ruling? In the busy and pressured world of a work-a-day attorney, how
much time can realistically be devoted to educating a lay person as to
the basic rubrics of divorce and alimony and property settlement
rights, not to mention the "intricacies" of the law alluded to in Orge?
How can a practitioner prove at a later date that the client was apprised of, let alone understood, these legal intricacies? The issue of
whether Org/eris still viable after enactment of the Uniform Act will be
discussed below.
IV.

CAN AN ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT BE INVALIDATED
AS UNCONSCIONABLE?

The simple answer under New Jersey law before the Uniform
Act was no. Many courts in other jurisdictions will validate an antenuptial agreement even where a full disclosure of assets is lacking
so long as the spouse has been fairly treated in the agreement. The
leading proponent of this position is the Florida Supreme Court as
postulated in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio.4"
NewJersey jurisprudence has adopted the obverse viewpointan antenuptial agreement will generally be upheld even where the
39
40

Id. at 349, 568 A.2d at 70.

Id. at 350, 568 A.2d at 70.
Id.
Id.
43 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). See infta footnotes 122-29 and accompanying text for a
discussion of unconscionability under the Uniform Act.
41
42

264

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:254

spouse was left no property so long as a full disclosure of assets has
been rendered. Thus, the Marschall court held that a spouse cannot demonstrate unconscionability "simply by showing a substantial
difference between his or her rights under the agreement, and
what might be awarded by a court in the absence of the
agreement."44
Thus, our courts have engrafted a highly circumscribed definition to the term "unconscionable" when used in the context of prenuptial agreements. They have allowed only a few narrow
exceptions to this stringent rule. For example, an agreement may
be unconscionable in the rare instance where the spouse has been
left destitute.4 5
Another subissue is whether an antenuptial agreement is unconscionable where it waives alimony or support payments to a
spouse. The usual measure for awarding alimony to a spouse upon
a divorce is the standard of living during the marriage. Marschall
held, however, that an antenuptial agreement can adopt a lower
standard of support or alimony to the spouse-such as his/her financial status before the marriage-and still be valid: "[T]here
does not seem anything inherently 'unfair' in an antenuptial agreement which uses a different standard-perhaps the somewhat
lower standard at which one spouse lived before the marriage." 46
Indeed, the Marschalldecision held that full disclosure obliterates any obligation to maintain a spouse at the level to which he/
she has become accustomed during marriage:
[A] ssuming full disclosure, if it were shown in the present case
that the purpose and effect of the agreement was to hold plaintiff harmless from any loss, and permit her to again live at the
reasonably comfortable standard she had enjoyed prior to marrying defendant (albeit somewhat less affluently than she lived
during the marriage) it is difficult to see why the agreement
44 Marschall v. Marschall, 195 N.J. Super. 16, 31, 477 A.2d 833, 841 (Ch. Div.
1984).
45 As Judge Imbriani explained in DeLorean:
This is not to say that the agreement should be what a court would determine to be "fair and equitable." The fact that what a spouse receives
under an antenuptial agreement is small, inadequate or disproportionate does not in itself render the agreement voidable if the spouse was
not overreached and entered into the agreement voluntarily with full
knowledge of the financial worth of the other person.... So long as a
spouse is not left destitute or as a public charge the parties can agree to
divide marital assets in any manner they wish.
DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 NJ. Super. 432, 437, 511 A.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Ch. Div.
1986).
46 Marschal4 195 N.J. Super. at 31, 477 A.2d at 841.
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should not be enforced.4 7
In a significant caveat, however, MarschaUcarved out a major exception to this rule. In dicta, Marschallsuggested that an antenuptial
agreement which relegates a spouse to the premarital living standard
may be "unconscionable" in "a long term marriage or one with children." 4' The MarschaU caveat, which was stated almost as an afterthought, provides fruitful ground for creative lawyers to try to invalidate antenuptial agreements which provide for paltry or no support
for a spouse in a long-term marriage and especially one with children.
V.

CAN "CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES" MODIFY
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS?

The MarschaU court averred-somewhat cryptically and in a
footnote-that "[a] ntenuptial agreements should, of course, be regarded as subject to modification by reason of 'changed circumstances' in the same manner as property settlement agreements."4 9
This statement will come as a rude awakening to the drafters of
antenuptial agreements and their clients who have the impression
that the provisions of such an agreement are irrevocable so long as
the proper procedures relating to disclosure and the like are followed. It is even more surprising that exposing antenuptial agreements to such a broadside attack would be relegated to a footnote.
The authority cited by Marschallin support of this footnote is
the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lepis v. Lepis,5 ° which
first announced the "changed circumstances" doctrine as applied
to divorce property settlement agreements. Litigants who wish to
invalidate an antenuptial agreement now have another linchpin on
which to forge their strategy.
The concept of "changed circumstances" as applied to antenuptial agreements has been cited in just two other cases and has
been applied only in one. The appellate division in D'Onofrio cited
to Judge Lesemann's footnote in Marschall but demurred from deciding the issue of the applicability of "changed circumstances" to
antenuptial agreements."' Judge Stephen J. Schaeffer, the Presiding Judge of the Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
47 Id.
48 Id.

49 Id. at 28 n.3, 477 A.2d at 839 n.3 (citing Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45
(1980)).
50 83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45 (1980).

51 D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 200 N.J. Super. 361, 366, 491 A.2d 752, 754 (App. Div.
1985).
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ruled on this issue in Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis,5 2 but found that it
was not applicable to the facts in that case as we will see below.
In short, the applicability and potential parameters of the concept of "changed circumstances" as applied to antenuptial agreements are still in their embryonic stages. A review of Lepis and its
progeny should provide some guidance to practitioners as well as
highlight those issues which are fertile for future development in
the antenuptial field.
The supreme court's landmark decision in Lepis recognized
the courts' equitable power to modify the terms of a property settlement agreement which had been incorporated in a final judgment of divorce in response to changed circumstances. The Lepis
court commenced with the basic principle governing support payments that the dependent spouse and children are entitled to be
maintained at the standard of living to which they had become accustomed prior to the divorce.
Changed circumstances warranting a modification in the parties' settlement agreement include: "an increase in the cost of living, . . . [an] increase or decrease in the supporting spouse's
income, .. . subsequent employment by the dependent spouse," an
illness or disability to one of the spouses and the maturation needs
of children.5" Future events which may result in a finding of
changed circumstances are not limited to those which were not
foreseeable. 5 4
As suggested by the examples enumerated above, changed circumstances could result in either a decrease or increase in support
payments. An increase will be awarded whenever changed circumstances "substantially impair the dependent spouse's ability to
maintain the standard of living reflected in the original decree or
agreement." 55 Conversely, Lepis held that "a decrease is called for
when circumstances render all or a portion of support received unnecessary for maintaining that standard."5 6
The concept of "changed circumstances" is thus a doubleedged sword which can be utilized both to decrease and increase
maintenance from the supporting spouse. Of course, in most instances, this concept has been invoked to increase support.
52 No. 251907, slip op. (Ch. Div. July 26, 1991), aftid, 260 N.J. Super. 50, 615 A.2d
266 (App. Div. 1992).
53 Lepis, 83 N.J. at 151, 416 A.2d at 51-52 (citations omitted).
54 Id. at 152, 416 A.2d at 52.
55 Id. at 152-53, 416 A.2d at 52.
56 Id. at 153, 416 A.2d at 52.
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Marschallsuggested that this doctrine would not be applicable
to an antenuptial agreement relating to a childless marriage of
short duration. As noted above, Marschall indicated that an antenuptial agreement could confine a spouse in such a marriage to
his/her premarital financial status. As set forth above, however,
Marschall also suggested that this may be unconscionable in the
case of a long-term marriage or one with children. Thus, in the
majority of marriages-those of long duration or with childrenMarschall can be cited to modify antenuptial agreements when
changed circumstances have occurred.
In light of the nature of most antenuptial agreements and recent cases interpreting Lepis, however, many open questions exist
regarding whether the principle of "changed circumstances" can
effectively be applied to modify most antenuptial agreements. The
reason for this stems from the appellate division's holding that
Lepis's "changed circumstances" standard applies only to the modification of alimony and support and not to provisions in an agreement dealing with equitable distribution." The appellate division
has made it clear that "[a] later change in a party's financial life is
essentially irrelevant" to the issue of equitable distribution and provides "no basis for modification."58

Some antenuptial agreements specifically provide for support
payments to the dependent spouse in the event of a divorce. The
changed circumstances concept would apparently be applicable to
these provisions of the antenuptial agreement, at least in a longterm marriage or one with children as suggested by MarschalL
Many antenuptial agreements, however, provide a lump-sum award
upon divorce. It would seem to be a matter of significant debate
whether such a payment represents support, equitable distribution
or a hybrid of both. It may be argued that a lump-sum payment
resembles equitable distribution because it presumably represents
some preconceived notion of division of assets. If this argument
prevails, there would be no modification of the agreement. On the
other hand, one may argue that such a lump-sum payment represents support and not equitable distribution because equitable distribution is an allocation of assets amassed by the joint efforts of
both spouses, and not just the efforts of one spouse as is usually the
57 Rosen v.Rosen, 225 N.J. Super. 33, 35-36, 541 A.2d 716, 718 (App. Div. 1988),
certf denied., 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988).
58 Gonnor v. Connor, 254 NJ. Super. 591, 602, 604 A.2d 158, 163 (App. Div.
1992).
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case with a lump-sum payment set forth in an antenuptial
agreement.
Further complicating this area, and making it yet more fertile
for the imaginative practitioner, is the courts' recognition that
"support payments" are often "intimately related to equitable
distribution." 9
In sum, the applicability of changed circumstances to antenuptial agreements is essentially an undeveloped area of our law
and one that is potentially complex depending on the particular
marriage and the provisions in the agreement. It can provide a
litigator with an invaluable opening with which to attack an antenuptial agreement.
VI.

ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND

DEATH

OF THE UNIFORm

BEFORE ENACTMENT

ACT

NewJersey's Uniform Premarital Agreement Act60 was enacted
effective November 3, 1988 and governs all antenuptial agreements
after its effective date. The Act was expressly made effective to an61
tenuptial agreements "executed on and after its effective date."
This Act will be discussed in detail below. Until its enactment, antenuptial agreements that came into effect at death were governed
by another statute,62 which was part of the Uniform Probate Code
adopted by New Jersey in 1980 with an effective date of May 28,
1980.63
The standards governing antenuptial agreements at the time
of death are significantly different under the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act and the Uniform Probate Code. Antenuptial
agreements which are enforceable under one statute may be invalid under the other statute. The date of execution of an antenuptial agreement is therefore critical.
In short, antenuptial agreements which were executed after
November 3, 1988, whether divorce or death ensues, are governed
by the standards of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. Antenuptial agreements resulting in divorce which were executed
before this date are governed by the principles in Marschalland its
progeny (many of which the Uniform Act has adopted). Antenup59 Lepis, 83 NJ. at 147, 416 A.2d at 49 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 72 NJ. 350, 360,
371 A.2d 1, 6 (1977); Connor,254 NJ. Super. at 598, 604 A.2d at 161-62).
60 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2-31 to -41 (West Supp. 1992).

61 Id. § 37:2-41.
62 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-10 (West 1983).
63 L.1979, c.483, §§ 4, 8.
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tial agreements resulting in death which were executed before the
Uniform Act are governed by section 3B:8-10. We shall proceed to
analyze this latter statute and the case law interpreting it and highlight some of the differences between this statute and the statutes
or legal principles governing other antenuptial agreements.
A.

Burden of Proof

The case law interpreting section 3B:8-10 uniformly holds that
the party contesting the antenuptial agreement bears the burden
of proof as to its illegality. In re Estate of Lopata64 interpreted the
Code "fair disclosure" statute codified
identical Uniform Probate
65
3B:8-10.
in section
New Jersey law requires that when a party asserts a claim
against an estate, that party bears the burden of proving the case by
"clear and convincing" evidence." There is also case law which
holds that when a spouse makes a claim against his/her deceased
spouse's estate in contravention of their antenuptial agreement,
that spouse also bears the heavy burden of proving the invalidity of
the agreement by "clear and convincing" evidence. 6 7
This should be contrasted with the burden of proof governing
antenuptial agreements in divorce cases before enactment of the
Uniform Act. As we saw in Marschall, the burden of proving the
invalidity of an antenuptial agreement in the divorce context was
on the proponent of the agreement. Interestingly, the Uniform
Act, as discussed below, adopted the approach of the Probate Code
as to the burden of proof.
B.

FairDisclosure
The pivotal characteristic of section 3B:8-10 is that it requires

641 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1982).
The court specifically held that under this statute:
It is well settled that once the proponent of an antenuptial agreement
has established the existence of the agreement itself, the party contesting the validity of the antenuptial agreement has the burden of proving fraud, concealment or failure to disclose material information.
Id. at 955.
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A81-2 (West 1976). Section 2A81-2 provides:
When 1 party to any civil action ... sues or is sued in a representative
capacity, any other party who asserts a claim ...against such ...representative, supported by oral testimony of a promise, statement or act...
of the decedent, shall be required to establish the same by clear and convincing
proof.
Id. (emphasis added).
67 In re Borton's Estate, 393 P. 2d 808, 812 (Wyo. 1964).
64
65
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only "fair" (as opposed to "full") disclosure to uphold an antenuptial agreement falling within its ambit. 68
C. FairDisclosureLaw in OtherJurisdictions
Until recently, there was no New Jersey case interpreting section 3B:8-10. The leading out-of-state case was In re Estate of
Lopata,69 which involved the identical Uniform Probate statute
codified at section 3B:8-10 in New Jersey. In Lopata, the husband
was ten years older than his wife. Both the husband and the wife
had children from previous marriages. The antenuptial agreement
in Lopata provided that each party "has full knowledge of the
other's assets."7" The agreement further stated that even if the
knowledge of the parties was inaccurate or incomplete, "the requirement to know the extent of the other's property is hereby
waived and stated to be of no consequence in the performance and
preparation of this contract."71 The agreement also provided that
each party "had full opportunity to counsel with the attorney of his
or her choice and each is fully satisfied with the terms and conditions contained herein."72 There was no other evidence that either
party had made disclosure to the other of his or her assets prior to
the signing of the agreement. Nor was there any evidence that
68 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-10 (West 1983). This section, which is part of the elective share statute, provides in pertinent part:
The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights of the surviving spouse may be waived, wholly or partially, before or after marriage
before, on or after May 28, 1980, by a written contract, agreement or
waiver, signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure.
Id. Section 3B:8-10 adopted the language of the Uniform Probate Code § 2-204. See
A. CLAPP, 5A NEw JERSEY PRACTICE, Wius AND ADMINISTRATION § 459 (Rev. 3d ed.
1982). By its terms, it applies to all antenuptial agreements waiving rights to an elective share, including antenuptial agreements entered into before as well as after the
statute's effective date of May 28, 1980. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-10 (West 1983).
The Official Comment to this section of the Uniform Probate Code can be invoked, where applicable, to protect the property which a decedent willed to children
of a prior marriage. The Official Comment provides, in part:
The provisions of this section, permitting a spouse or prospective
spouse to waive all statutory rights in the other spouse's property seem
desirable in view of the common and commendable desire of parties to
second and later marriages to insure that property derived from prior
spouses passes at death to the issue of the prior spouses instead of to the
newly acquired spouse.
A. CIAPP, supra, § 459 (quoting UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-204 official cmt.).
69 641 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1982).
70 Id. at 953.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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either party had actual knowledge of the nature and extent of the
other's assets.
The court found that the decedent husband's net worth at the
time of the antenuptial agreement was approximately $1 million.
By the terms of the antenuptial agreement, Mr. Lopata was required to, and did, bequeath $100,000 to the plaintiff at the time
of his death.
The trial court found that the wife had one year of college
education and also had previously consulted professionals, including lawyers. The trial court also found that the plaintiff was "well
versed in day-to-day business affairs" and had operated a retail business with her first husband until his death. 3 She had also been
appointed administratrix to her first husband's estate and worked
with an attorney-accountant in selling the business and closing the
estate.
The court concluded that the evidence failed by any standard
to establish fraud, concealment, material misrepresentation or undue influence by the deceased husband. The Lopata court found
that the wife failed to meet her burden, and it therefore denied
her request to have the antenuptial agreement set aside.
Similarly, in Ruzic v. Ruzic, 75 the Supreme Court of Alabama
recently interpreted the same "fair disclosure" statute of the Uniform Probate Code codified at section 3B:8-10. In Ruzic, the par73

Id. at 954.

74 Id. at 955. The Supreme Court of Colorado in Lopata held that:

Fair disclosure is not synonymous with detailed disclosure such as a financial statement of net worth and income. The mere fact that detailed
disclosure was not made will not necessarily be sufficient to set aside an
otherwise properly executed agreement. Where the agreement was
freely executed, the fact that one party did not disclose in detail to the
other party the nature, extent, and value of his or her property will not
alone invalidate the agreement or raise a presumption of fraudulent
concealment. Fair disclosure contemplates that each spouse should be
given information, of a general and approximate nature, concerning
the net worth of the other. Each party has a duty to consider and evaluate the information received before signing an agreement since they are
not assumed to have lost their judgmental faculties because of their
pending marriage.
In estate proceedings, where there is a claim that the surviving
spouse has waived his or her rights, the legislature has codified the fair
disclosure requirement by adopting section 2-204 of the Uniform Probate Code. This section provides that rights acquired incident to marriage may be waived, "before or after marriage, by a written contract,
agreement, or waiver signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure."
Id. (citations omitted).
75 549 So. 2d 72 (Ala. 1989).
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ties were both previously married. They entered into an
antenuptial agreement in which they waived any right to the other
person's property. The agreement in Ruzic did not set forth any of
the parties' assets. The court found that the spouse did not know
the "value of Mr. Ruzic's real property or his net worth."7 6 The
court further found that plaintiff had personal knowledge of some
(but not all) of decedent's property before their marriage. The
court held that "[s] he may have not known the precise number of
acres he owned, but she knew that he owned an interest in these
properties." 77 The court also found that the wife knew that one of
decedent's properties was worth approximately $180,000. The
court concluded that "Mrs. Ruzic may not have known Mr. Ruzic's
net worth to the dollar, but she clearly knew, before she executed
the [antenuptial agreement], that he owned a substantial interest in
real estate and other property. "78 According to the Alabama
Supreme Court, the fact that the document was witnessed and notarized indicated that the spouse had considered the matter
seriously. 79
Notwithstanding plaintiff's lack of full knowledge of decedent's assets and her lack of knowledge of his net worth, the court
ruled that the "fair disclosure" standard in the statute had been
fulfilled. The court held that the facts of the case conformed to
the standard in the statute and constituted "fair disclosure."
In In re Estate of Hill a° the Supreme Court of Nebraska also
interpreted the same "fair disclosure" statute codified at section
3B:8-10. Again, it was held that fair disclosure "is not synonymous
with detailed disclosure such as a financial statement of net worth
and income."" l The Nebraska Supreme Court explained that "the
fact that one party did not disclose in detail to the other party the
nature, extent and value of his or her property will not alone invalidate the agreement or raise a presumption of fraudulent
2
concealment."
D.

FairDisclosure in New Jersey: Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis
The seminal case in New Jersey interpreting section 3B:8-10 is

Id. at 73.
Id. at 76.
Id.
79 Id.
80 335 N.W.2d 750 (Neb. 1983).
81 Id. at 753 (citing In re Estate of Lopata, 641 P. 2d 952, 955 (Colo. 1982)).
82 Id.
76
77
78
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Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis.83
The unpublished decision rendered by the chancery judge was
affirmed by the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. In
a tribute to the trial judge, the appeals court commended Judge
Schaeffer for his "thorough and thoughtful" opinion.8 4
In Chrisomalis, the plaintiff widow sought to invalidate an antenuptial agreement executed in 1982 which waived her right to an
elective share in her decedent husband's estate. The decedent's
last will and testament bequeathed all his real and personal property to his two sons from his first marriage.
The Chrisomalises had met on two occasions over a period of
eleven days with the attorney who prepared the antenuptial agreement before their marriage. The attorney had represented each of
them on previous occasions in independent matters. He advised
the couple to disclose to each other the various assets which each
owned. Appended to the antenuptial agreement was a document
which purported to list all of the assets of the respective parties.
The trial court noted that "noticeably absent" from this document
was "the valuation of each of the stated assets, as well as any liabilities attributed to either of the parties."8 5
At the time of the agreement's execution, the plaintiff asked
the attorney's secretary who was present, "Should I do this?" The
court found from the testimony that the plaintiff maintained the
option to execute the agreement. Plaintiff testified that she loved
and trusted the decedent and therefore chose to sign the
agreement.
The decedent told his two sons about the antenuptial agreement just before it was executed. He assured them that their inheritance would be protected and that they would continue to own
the family business in which they had worked since childhood.
The court found that it was the decedent's desire to secure the
family assets from any claim by the plaintiff or her three sons from
a prior marriage.
The evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff "began to enjoy
a lifestyle far greater than the one she had prior to the marriage."86
In a seven-year marriage, plaintiff received from decedent several
83 260 N.J. Super. 50, 615 A.2d 266 (App. Div. 1992). The Honorable Stephen J.
Schaeffer, Presiding Judge of the Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County sat
below. Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis, No. 251907, slip op. (Ch. Div. July 26, 1991).
84 Id. at 58, 615 A-2d at 271.
85 Chrisomalis,No. 251907, slip op. at 2-3.
86 Id. at 4.
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parcels of real property, various stock and securities, jewelry, numerous fur coats and other assets. The court found that the plaintiff had "a comfortable and secure marriage" and that "she has
87
been left comfortable since decedent's death."
Decedent was also generous to plaintiff's three sons. He provided numerous gifts such as automobiles and two cooperative
apartments for them, and paid for their college education, including medical school in the Caribbean for one of the plaintiff's sons.
After her husband's death, Mrs. Chrisomalis sued his estate
and his two sons and attacked the antenuptial agreement on several grounds.
First, she contended that she was deprived of independent
counsel. There were a myriad of facts, however, which militated
against her position. First, plaintiff was well-educated with several
postgraduate degrees and held a responsible position with the
Jersey City Board of Education. Second, plaintiff had been previously divorced. As part of these prior proceedings, she was represented by counsel and agreed to the waiver of alimony and the
division of property. Third, her brother-in-law was a retired superior court judge who had previously rendered legal advice to her.
Fourth, although the decedent initiated the drawing of the antenuptial agreement with the attorney, both parties had independently used his professional services prior to the antenuptial
agreement. Fifth, the agreement was executed over a week and a
half period after the parties had exchanged financial information,
giving the plaintiff time to contemplate the agreement. As Judge
Schaeffer observed: "This agreement was not signed on the 'doorsteps of the church.' "88

The court contrasted this case with DeLorean,where the spouse
"was presented with an antenuptial agreement only a few hours
before the wedding." 9 Nonetheless, as noted above, the DeLorean
court upheld the agreement. 90
Judge Schaeffer also pointed out that the case law had established that "[t]he lack of independent counsel is certainly not dispositive in determining the validity of an antenuptial agreement." 9'
Id. at 4-5.
88 Id. at 6.
87

89 Id.
90 DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J. Super. 432, 445, 511 A.2d 1257, 1264 (Ch. Div.

1986). See footnotes 32-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the DeLorean
decision.
91 Chrisomalis,No. 251907, slip op. at 6.
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In support of this proposition Judge Schaeffer referred to, inter
alia, the appellate division's pronouncement in D'Onofrio.
The court determined that plaintiff "had every opportunity to
be represented by independent counsel," that she was "not
thwarted or discouraged by the decedent from obtaining" independent counsel and that "in fact, she chose to be dually represented" by the attorney.92 Accounting for these circumstances, and
the extant legal principles, the court concluded that the plaintiff
"made an intelligent and informed waiver of independent
counsel."93
Mrs. Chrisomalis next attacked the antenuptial agreement for
alleged inadequacy of disclosure of the decedent's assets. It was
undisputed that the agreement listed the decedent's assets but did
not assign any values to them. Plaintiff believed that this was the
fatal flaw to the agreement. She cited to what appeared to be the
uniform dogma of all the New Jersey cases which had applied New
Jersey law to antenuptial agreements up to that time. Those cases
all held that under NewJersey law an antenuptial agreement would
be stricken unless it provided full disclosure, which required specifying values.9 4 To make her case seemingly ironclad, plaintiff invoked the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act which unequivocally
required "full" disclosure. 95
The decedent's sons countered that none of this law was controlling on the issue of disclosure with respect to the antenuptial
agreement at issue. They pointed out that the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act did not become effective until 1988, several years
after execution of the agreement. Further, the new Act was expressly made prospective in its application.96
The sons also argued that the full disclosure rule adopted by
Marschalland its progeny applied only to divorce cases and not to
antenuptial agreements which become effective at death-at least
for agreements executed before the passage of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. They maintained that the controlling law
was section 3B:8-10, which was enacted as part of the Uniform Probate Code and applied to all agreements waiving an elective share
92

Id. at 5.

93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Marschall v. Marschall, 195 N.J. Super. 16, 477 A.2d 833 (Ch. Div. 1984);
DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J. Super. 432, 511 A.2d 1257 (Ch. Div. 1986);
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 200 N.J. Super. 361, 491 A.2d 752 (App. Div. 1985); Orgler v.
Orgler, 237 N.J. Super. 342, 568 A.2d 67 (App. Div. 1989).

95 N.J. STAT. ANN. §
96 Id. § 39:2-41.

37:2-38(c) (1) (West Supp. 1992).
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which were executed before the 1988 enactment of the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act. As set forth above, this enactment required "fair" and not "full" disclosure. The sons maintained that
the "fair disclosure" requirement of this statute had been fulfilled.
Judge Schaeffer first agreed that the "full" disclosure requirement of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act was not applicable
because the Act was not ratified until August 5, 1988 and did not
become effective until ninety days thereafter. 97 Similarly, Judge
Schaeffer found that the "full disclosure" case law did not apply
because these cases were concerned only with divorce proceedings.
Judge Schaeffer explained:
This court does not find that NewJersey case law requiring "full
and complete disclosure of... financial worth" for there to be a
valid antenuptial agreement applicable to this matter. Org/er v.
Orgler, 237 NJ. Super. 342, 350 (App. Div. 1989); DeLorean v.
DeLorean, 211 NJ. Super. 432, 438 (Ch. Div. 1985). The above
cases involved divorce proceedings and were concerned with the
waiver of one's statutory rights under NJ.S. 2A-34-23 as it pertained to alimony and equitable distribution. Therefore, the
waiver of one's elective share right was not at issue in the 8cases
9
cited above, and NJ.S. 3B:8-10 is controlling in this case.
Insofar as the subject agreement was executed in 1982, and involved
waiver of the elective share, Judge Schaeffer determined that section
3B:8-10 with its "fair disclosure" waiver provision was the controlling
statute.
Because this was a case of first impression in New Jersey, Judge
Schaeffer looked to the cases in other jurisdictions which had defined
"fair disclosure" under this statute. The court relied in part on the
Colorado Supreme Court's decision in In re Estate of Lopata,0 0 which
held that disclosure of value was not required under the Uniform Probate Code. Judge Schaeffer also found that the case law distinguished
between the disclosure necessary in antenuptial agreements which
take effect at death and those which become operative upon divorce.1 °° The court further found that the plaintiff had a general and
Chrisomalis,No. 251907, slip op. at 6.
98 Id. at 9.
99 641 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1982).
100 Chrisomalis,No. 251907, slip op. at 7. The court ruled:
Additionally, the case law that reflects the standard for disclosure during the time of the execution of the antenuptial in question, distinguishes between agreements made in contemplation of death versus
agreements made in contemplation of divorce. See Marschall v. Marschall, 195 NJ. Super 16 (Ch. Div. 1984) (cited favorably in D'Onofrio
v. D'Onofrio, 200 NJ. Super. 361, 366 (App. Div. 1985)). Antenuptial
97

1993]

ANTENUPTIAL LAW

277

approximate knowledge of the decedent's property prior to the marriage. This knowledge, the court observed, was garnered during the
couple's four-year courtship.
Finally, the court addressed plaintiff's attempt to invalidate the
agreement based on the "change of circumstances" doctrine. At decedent's death, a substantial mortgage remained on one of the properties he had gifted to her. Judge Schaeffer held that this was "an
insufficient basis for setting aside the agreement when the facts are
reviewed in their entirety." 1 1
The facts at trial had revealed that plaintiffs equity from decedent's many gifts of real and personal property far exceeded her debts
and that plaintiff was left with considerable assets by decedent. The
court therefore readily disposed of plaintiffs changed circumstances
claim:
Based on the facts and testimony presented, it is evident that the
decedent provided handsomely for the plaintiff based on his reliance of the validity of the antenuptial agreement. The plaintiff
had knowledge of the decedent's assets, and there was fair disclosure of those assets. The plaintiff is a sophisticated individual. The fact that plaintiff now believes she should have
received more from the decedent or to be debt free does not
justify setting aside the antenuptial agreement. 10 2
agreements executed in contemplation of death have always been
viewed with favor whereas those in contemplation of divorce have not.
The court in Maischallstated: "Antenuptial or so-called 'marriage settlement' contracts by which the parties agree upon and fix the property
rights which either spouse will have in the estate of the other upon his
or her death have.., long been recognized as being conducive to marital tranquility and thus in harmony with public policy."
Id.
The court elaborated on the public policy underpinning this distinction as expressed in the Official Comment to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-10:
The New Jersey legislature and the numerous jurisdictions (including
those previously cited) are all in agreement that antenuptial agreements
executed in contemplation of death are only natural and proper. It is
understandable and logical that a parent provide for and protect the
children of his or her first marriage.
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
The Chrisomalis court acknowledged that the decedent had made the requisite
fair disclosure: "Decedent's disclosure may not have had valuations for each asset, but
an inventory was attached to the agreement, which revealed in full every asset owned
by the decedent." Id. Ironically, the only party who had not listed all her assets on
this inventory turned out to be the plaintiff. Id. at 6.
101 Id. at 10.
102 Id. at 10-11.
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UmFORM PREMARrAL AGREEMENT AcT

The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act' 0 3 was enacted on August 5, 1988, and became effective ninety days thereafter on November 3, 1988. The Uniform Act codified under one statutory
scheme the legal principles that apply both to antenuptial agreements which take effect at divorce (or separation) and those that
become effective at death. For the first time, the provisions that
control the validity of all antenuptial agreements were made uniform regardless of whether the agreement concerns division of
marital property or a decedent's estate.'
That having been said, however, does not vitiate from the continued relevance of the pre-Uniform Act antenuptial law discussed
in detail above. This conclusion is based on a number of factors.
As noted, the Uniform Act is prospective in its application, and
therefore all antenuptial agreements executed before November 3,
1988 are governed by the prior law. It is fair conjecture that most
of the antenuptial agreements which are presently in effect were
executed before the enactment of this Act.
Further, the Uniform Act specifically permits the parties to decide the "choice of law governing the construction of the agreement."10 5 The parties can therefore agree to choose the fair
disclosure law standard of another state to control the validity and
interpretation of their agreement. This is exactly what occurred in
the DeLorean case.
Many of the concepts incorporated in the Uniform Act had
precursors in the prior law. Thus, one must look to this prior body
of law for guidance on the interpretation of some of the most salient provisions of the Uniform Act. The continued relevance of the
prior law is further buttressed by the fact that as of this writing
there have been no New Jersey cases decided pursuant to any of
the provisions of the Uniform Act.
A.

Burden of Proof

The Uniform Act essentially adopted the standard of proof utilized in the fair disclosure cases decided under the Uniform Probate Code, section 3B:8-10, and the correlative burden of proof
statute. 1°6 The Uniform Act specifically provides that the "burden
of proof to set aside a premarital agreement shall be upon the
103
104
105
106

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2-31 to -41 (West Supp. 1992).
Id. § 37:2-34(c).
Id. § 3 7 :2-34(g).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-2 (West 1976 & Supp. 1992).
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party alleging the agreement to be unenforceable."1 °7 This was the
same standard applied by the prior case law which had been applicable to waiver of elective shares.108 Similarly, the Uniform Act
adopted the level of proof set forth in section 2A:81-2 and requires
that the evidence attacking the antenuptial agreement must be
"clear and convincing."' °9 The Uniform Act thus overruled Marschal's edict that the burden of proof is placed on the proponent
of the antenuptial agreement.
B. Full Disclosure
One section of the Uniform Act, entitled "Formalities," provides that a premarital agreement shall have "a statement of assets
annexed thereto."110 Another section of the Act, governing general enforcement of premarital agreements, provides a multi-level
test to determine whether the disclosure is adequate.' 1 1 This section provides that, generally, an antenuptial agreement will be set
aside if the spouse "was not provided full and fair disclosure of the
12
earnings, property and financial obligations of the other party."'
It is somewhat perplexing why the Legislature would juxtapose the
words "full and fair" in this phrase because presumably the term
"fair" is subsumed under the rubric "full." There may be an opening here for an ingenious litigator to claim that the Legislature intended some distinction between the two terms because otherwise
the term "fair" would be surplusage. However, in light of the definition of "full" disclosure enunciated in Marschall and its progeny,
it seems a foregone conclusion that this subsection of the statute
will be interpreted to require an inclusion of the value and
amounts of the spouse's income, assets and debts, thus permitting
a ready calculation of each spouse's net worth.
This is the heart of the Uniform Act. It has established, with
very important exceptions to be discussed, that the Marschall standard of full disclosure will in the future be relevant to all antenuptial agreements, whether relating to divorce or death. It also
demarcates the task for practitioners in this area. The primary
work for lawyers where this provision is applicable is to ensure that
such full disclosure takes place. Most clients are strongly disinId. § 37:2-38.
108 See supra notes 68-102 and accompanying text (discussing N.J.
10).
109 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-38 (West Supp. 1992).
110 Id. § 37:2-33.
111 Id. § 37:2-38(c).
112 Id. § 37:2-38(c)(1).
107

STAT.

ANN. 3B:8-
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clined to make such full disclosure of their assets and net worth.
The success one achieves in convincing one's client of the strict
command of the law in making such disclosure will determine the
subsequent susceptibility of the agreement to attack.
An investigation should be conducted to ensure compliance.
Reviewing a client's personal income tax and all business tax returns may reveal other assets owned and debts incurred by the client. Other financial statements, bank deposit books, bank and
checking account statements, statements as to IRA, KEOGH, and
other pension plans, deeds, appraisals, and other financial records
should also be reviewed. In some instances, especially where substantial assets are at issue, new appraisals and business valuations
should be conducted. Certified public accountants might be retained by both sides to participate in formulating an agreed upon
list of all assets and liabilities with amounts. Copies of the tax returns, bank statements, appraisals, business valuations, the accountants' statement of the assets, liabilities and net worth of each party
and other financial records might be appended as exhibits to the
antenuptial agreement.
Of course, not every antenuptial agreement may warrant this
degree of work and concomitant fees. Ajudgment call will have to
be made by the client and attorney working in tandem. At the very
least, however, where an attorney is not satisfied with the extent or
quality of the financial information supplied by the client, the attorney should protect herself by incorporating in a writing her advice to the client as to the full disclosure requirements of the
Uniform Act.
It is important to underscore that the legal requirement to
make full disclosure falls equally on both parties. While the onus
of ensuring full disclosure primarily rests on the attorney representing the client with the most assets (simply because there is
more to disclose), the attorney for the other spouse cannot ignore
this obligation. She too must be vigilant to ensure full disclosure
by the client with the fewer assets. The disclosure requirement is
neutral in its application and can benefit either party. It can be
invoked by the party attacking the agreement by alleging that the
party with the greater assets failed to make full disclosure. The
party defending the agreement, however, may well be able to preclude an attack on the agreement by alleging the spouse's unclean
hands in failing to make the requisite full disclosure.
Lest one conclude that the latter argument is merely theoretical, with no practical applicability, the practitioner is referred to
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the recent pronouncement by the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, in Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis.113 There, the court
declared that unclean hands will bar a litigant from trying to invalidate an antenuptial agreement:
The basic equitable maxim of unclean hands provides that "[a]
suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and...
must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings." A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending
Corp., 2 NJ. 235, 246, 66 A.2d 319, 324 (1949); accordJohnson v.
Johnson, 212 NJ. Super. 368, 384, 515 A.2d. 255, 263 (Ch. Div.
1986); Pollino v. Pollino, 39 NJ. Super. 294, 298-99, 121 A.2d
62, 65 (Ch. Div. 1957). "In simple parlance, it merely gives expression to the equitable principle that a court should not grant
relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit." Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507, 511, 427 A.2d 1105,
1107 (1981). While "[u]sually applied to a plaintiff, this maxim
means that a court of equity will refuse relief to [any] party who
has acted in a manner contrary to the principles of equity." Johnson, 212 NJ. Super. at 384, 515 A.2d at 263.114
C.

Other Disclosure

Although the grammatical conjunctions used in the Uniform
Act are somewhat ambiguous in their placement, the Act apparently provides that an antenuptial agreement which gives less than
"full" disclosure is still valid so long as certain conditions are met.
Parties apparently are at liberty under the Act to waive any disclosure. The Uniform Act provides that the parties can "voluntarily
and expressly waive . . . any right to disclosure of the property or
financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided."1 15 The only requirement is that such waiver be "in
writing."116
Although given little attention by practitioners, this provision
grants far-reaching power to the party in a proposed antenuptial
agreement who owns the bulk of the premarital property and who
is usually the party insisting on such an agreement. This provision
goes a long way in eviscerating the "full" disclosure requirement
first proclaimed by the Marschallcourt. Presumably, the party who
owns the bulk of the assets will be able to pressure the spouse to go
along with such a waiver of disclosure for fear of sabotaging the
113 260 N.J.Super. 50 (App. Div. 1992).
114 Id. at 53-54.
115 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-38(c)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
116 Id.
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marriage. This essentially happened in many of the "full disclosure" cases discussed above where the antenuptial agreement was
invalidated. In this very significant respect, the Uniform Act has
come full circle by giving the monied spouse powers which Marschall seemingly had abolished long ago. The force of the provision may be mollified somewhat by a separate clause in the Act
where the party
which states that an agreement will be invalidated
"executed the agreement involuntarily."' 17
Finally, in its multi-level approach to disclosure, the Uniform
Act apparently will also uphold an agreement where the party had
"an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of
the other party."" 8 By this provision, the Legislature ostensibly intended to make it clear that an antenuptial agreement will not be
invalidated even where full disclosure is not rendered and where
the spouse had personal knowledge of the other spouse's assets independent of the disclosures in the agreement itself. This provision in effect incorporated the appellate division's holding in the
D'Onofrio case discussed above.
What remains unclear is the definition of "adequate knowledge." It does not appear that this can be equated with the same
financial information required under the definition of "full disclosure" because the word "adequate" obviously denotes a lower standard of disclosure, perhaps along the lines of the disclosure
approved in the prior "fair disclosure" law under the Uniform Probate Act. If so, the rationale for giving a spouse less disclosure
based on personal knowledge than that contemplated by full disclosure is problematic.
D. Independent Legal Counsel
Whether a party to an antenuptial agreement consulted with
independent counsel is an issue which courts have factored into
their overall assessment as to the validity of an agreement. Before
enactment of the Uniform Act, however, this was not a dispositive
issue, and antenuptial agreements were upheld where the spouse
had no opportunity to consult with her own counsel of choice or
where no such legal consultation occurred." 9
The Uniform Act eliminated this uncertainty by providing
clear and irrevocable rules as to the procedure one must follow if
Id. § 37:2-38(a).
Id. § 37:2-38(c) (3).
119 See DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J. Super. 432, 511 A.2d 1257 (Ch. Div 1986);
D'Onoftio v. D'Onofrio, 200 N.J. Super. 361, 491 A.2d 752 (App. Div. 1985).
"7

118
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independent counsel is to be waived. Failure of counsel to adhere
to the Act's statutory provision on waiving independent counsel is
malpractice per se, as the agreement will automatically be invalidated on this failure alone no matter what disclosure was made or
what property was provided to the spouse.
The Uniform Act requires that each spouse consult with "independent" counsel. Thus, the typical situation where the husband foists an attorney of his own choosing on his fiancee at the
eleventh hour, such as occurred in DeLorean, or the situation where
no consultation occurred, as in D'Onofrio, can no longer receive
judicial sanction. As with other sections of the Uniform Act, the
spouse with the assets is afforded a recourse to eschew this mandate. Independent legal counsel can be waived so long as this
waiver is "in writing"-in other words, the agreement must contain
a specific clause in which the independent counsel is waived.12 °
Such waiver must also be made "voluntarily."' 2 1 It is probable, however, that there will be a strong presumption that the waiver was
"voluntary" in light of the express written waiver.
E.

Unconscionability Under the Uniform Act

The Uniform Act established that the issue of unconscionability will be exclusively within the purview of the court and not the
jury. The Uniform Act provides that "[t]he issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be determined by the court as a
122
matter of law."

The Uniform Act expressly provides that an antenuptial agreement will be unenforceable if it is "unconscionable.'

23

Interest-

ingly, the Act provides that the issue of unconscionability must be
determined as of "the time enforcement was sought. " 1 24 This

would allow for another level of investigation quite different from
that raised by the issue of disclosure. A determination of whether
the provided disclosure comported with the Uniform Act entails
review of the assets which were owned by each party at the time of
the agreement's execution. An assessment of whether an agreement was "unconscionable" will usually entail analysis of the parties' relative assets many years thereafter.
Thus, a spouse's assets, both those owned before and after the
120 N.J. STAT. ANN. §
121 Id.
122 Id. § 37:2-38(d).
123 Id. § 37:2-38(b).
124 Id.

37:2-38(c) (4) (West Supp. 1992).
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marriage, become relevant whenever an antenuptial agreement is
attacked under the Uniform Act. The attacker of an antenuptial
agreement can thus level a two-pronged assault on the antenuptial
agreement-the first based on the alleged inadequacy of the disclosure provided at the time of the execution of the agreement,
and the second based on the alleged unconscionability of the effect of the antenuptial agreement at the time when it is attacked.
The Uniform Act defines an agreement as unconscionable
where one of three conditions are caused "due to a lack of property or unemployability."1 21 One of the three conditions which
would make the agreement unconscionable occurs where enforcement would "make a spouse a public charge. " 126 This is a reiteration of the law already established by the DeLorean court.
The second condition that would render an agreement unconscionable occurs when the agreement provides a standard of living
"far below that which was enjoyed before the marriage. " 12 7 Again,
this standard was alluded to in prior case law, specifically in the
Marschallcase discussed above. The Uniform Act, however, did not
specifically adopt Marschalts dicta that this before-marriage standard of living may be unconscionable in a long-term marriage or a
marriage with children. Thus, subject to what will be stated immediately below, the Uniform Act arguably may afford less protection
to a spouse than prior case law.
The last condition that will cause an antenuptial agreement to
be "unconscionable" is if it renders a spouse "without a means of
reasonable support."'12

This obviously affords a spouse more pro-

tection than the other two conditions discussed above. This provision points to another instance where the Uniform Act seems to
contain surplusage. For example, there is no need for the provision prohibiting the spouse from being rendered a public charge
in light of the provision requiring that the spouse be left with a
means of reasonable support. It may be that such seemingly unnecessary language was intended by way of clarification and an
adoption of prior court rulings.
The Uniform Act does not define "reasonable support," but it
is obvious that it will afford a spouse dissatisfied with the antenuptial agreement considerable leeway to attack the agreement. A
determination of what constitutes such reasonable support would
125
126
127
128

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

37:2-32(c).
37:2-32(c)(2).
37:2-32(c)(3).
37:2-32(c)(1).
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be particularly fact sensitive. A spouse in a long-term marriage
with children who gave up a career will certainly be in a position to
argue, in line with Marschall, that her level of support must be
greater than a short-term marriage or a marriage where the spouse
continued his/her career.
A spouse who is left to care for minor children may be in a
position under the Uniform Act to augment her argument as to
the unconscionability of the antenuptial agreement. The Uniform
Act expressly provides that a premarital agreement "shall not adversely affect the right of a child to support." 12 9 The proponent of
the agreement, however, can argue that this provision will not invalidate the antenuptial agreement. The proponent can contend
that failure to provide adequately for the children of the marriage
in the antenuptial agreement will be resolved by the court under
this section but does not relate to the provisions in the Uniform
Act on unconscionability. If this argument prevails, then the antenuptial agreement will not be voided and any failure to provide
adequately for the children of a marriage will be rectified by section 37:2-35.
To avoid a successful attack on grounds of unconscionability, a
well-drafted agreement must provide for reasonable support for a
spouse and minor children in the event of divorce or death. The
agreement may be crafted to take account of contingencies including different payments or awards of assets depending on the length
of the marriage, the number of minor children, and their ages and
the like.
F. The Applicability of Orgler After the Uniform Act
The Org/er decision, discussed above, invalidated an antenuptial agreement on two grounds.13 0 First, Org/er invoked the Marschall principle of full disclosure of assets. The Uniform Act's
provisions on such disclosure, including their modifications of the
Marschallprinciple, have already been delineated.
Org/eralso invalidated the antenuptial agreement based on the
spouse's failure to make an informed waiver of her property rights
and alimony entitlement. An important issue is therefore raised:
Did the Uniform Act preserve the second Org/er principle as a basis
to attack a prenuptial agreement?
Org/erwas decided after enactment of the Uniform Act. How129

Id. § 37:2-35.

130 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Org/er

decision.
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ever, the Uniform Act did not govern the Orglers' antenuptial
agreement because it had been executed before the effective date
of the Uniform Act. The drafters of the Uniform Act therefore did
not have the benefit of the Orgier decision. Accordingly, it might
be argued that the Org/er holding was not integrated in the Act's
provisions.
Those wishing to attack an antenuptial agreement are not
without refuge. They can invoke a section of the Uniform Act
which provides that an antenuptial agreement will be set aside if a
party "executed the agreement involuntarily." 3 ' The Act does not
define the term "involuntarily," thus suggesting the application of
common law principles, as espoused in Orgier and other cases, to
this section.
In Org/er, the future wife's attorney had been selected by Mr.
Orgler. She met him for the first time on the day the agreement
was signed and consulted with him for less than an hour. An open
issue is whether the courts will delve into the advice received by a
party from her attorney if that party had been represented by an
attorney of her own choosing and had consulted with her attorney
in advance. Also unresolved is the effect of a party's waiver of independent counsel under the Uniform Act (pursuant to section
37:2-38 (c) (4)) on the question of whether the agreement was entered into "involuntarily" under section 37:2-38(a). Does a party's
written waiver of independent counsel absolutely bar a claim of involuntary execution? If our courts answer this question in the affirmative, then, the Uniform Act has substantially (and perhaps
unwittingly) retracted additional safeguards enunciated in New
Jersey decisional law.
CONCLUSION

This Article has surveyed antenuptial law in New Jersey. A
framework has been provided as a guide to comprehend the intricacies of this complex area of law. The Uniform Probate Code and
decisional law govern antenuptial agreements before enactment of
the Uniform Act, which became effective on November 3, 1988.
The Uniform Act has abandoned the dichotomy in the principles
between agreements pertaining to divorce or an elective share
which existed before its passage. The practitioner, however, must
still be cognizant of the pre-Uniform Act law for those agreements
executed before its enactment because the Uniform Act's applica131

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 37:2-38(a) (West Supp. 1992).

1993]

ANTENUPTAL LAW

287

bility is prospective. Moreover, although the Act clarified certain
areas of the law, it also incorporated provisions which require a
revisiting of the prior case law. Finally, in certain important respects, New Jersey antenuptial law has come full circle insofar as
the Uniform Act has created certain openings which may allow for
less protection to the unwary and for the inclusion of provisions in
antenuptial agreements which hearken back to the pre-Marschall
era.

